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mathematics,	 and	 logic:	 you’re	 not	 supposed	 to	 assent	 to	 a	 proposi-
tion	unless	you	perceive	it	clearly	and	distinctly.	Descartes	designed	





this	 is	 what	 most	 people	 fail	 to	 do	 and	 what	 I	 have	 mainly	 tried	 to	
teach	by	my	Meditations”	(AT	3:272).	
Most	interpreters	recognize	that	clear	and	distinct	perception	plays	





































term	 ‘perception’	 refers	 to	 the	 act	of	perceiving.	The	 term	 ‘idea’	 can	
also	refer	to	the	act	of	perceiving,	but	it	more	often	refers	to	the	object 
of	perception,	the	thing	perceived,	and	so	that	is	how	I	use	it	here.3
A	perception	 is	not	by	 itself	a	belief	or	 judgement;	 it	merely	pro-







the	book,	and	in	this	passage	in	particular,	 that I	am	taking	the	word	 ‘idea’	
to	refer	to	whatever	is	immediately	perceived	by	the	mind	[quod immediate a 
mente percipitur]” (AT	7:181).	One	way	of	understanding	the	relation	between	






Other	 interpreters	 venture	 to	 explicate	 the	 nature	 of	 clarity	 and	
distinctness.	They	generally	recognize	that	Descartes	defines	distinct-
ness	 in	 terms	 of	 clarity:	 a	 distinct	 perception	 “contains	 within	 itself	

























A distinct perception is just a completely clear perception. 
Here	is	the	plan:	In	§1,	I	lay	out	some	basic	points	about	Descartes’s	
appeal	to	clear	and	distinct	perception.	In	§2,	I	expose	problems	for	the	
dominant	 interpretation,	 which	 attempts	 to	 analyze	 clarity	 (and	 dis-
tinctness)	in	terms	of	an	objective	property	of	intentional	content,	like	
truth.	In	§3,	I	explain	the	alternative	view	that	clarity	is	a	phenomenal	



















you	 thereby	 form	 constitutes	 what	 Descartes	 calls	 cognitio	 of	 those	
truths.	As	 it	was	used	 in	ordinary	Latin,	 cognitio could	be	 translated	
as	 ‘knowledge’,	 but	 Descartes	 often	 prefaces	 it	 with	 adjectives	 like	











7.	 Descartes	 goes	 on	 to	 explain	 that	 clear	 and	 distinct	 perception	 is	 not	 suf-
ficient	 for	 the	highest	grade	of	knowledge,	namely	scientia,	which	 requires	












the	 meditator	 first	 comes	 to	 have	 a	 clear	 and	 distinct	 perception	 of 
herself	through	the	cogito argument	in	Meditation	Two,	she	perceives	
clearly	 and	 distinctly	 that she	 exists,	 without	 perceiving	 clearly	 and	










Second,	clear	and	distinct	perception	 is	 infallible: “whatever	 I	per-
ceive	clearly	and	distinctly	is	true”	(AT	7:35).6	Something	cannot	be	the	
4.	 When	Mersenne	asks	Descartes	about	whether	the	contents	of	ideas	should	








6.	 Cf.	AT	7:62,	65,	70.	I	am	using	 ‘infallible’	 in	our	contemporary	sense	of	the	
term.	Descartes	himself	uses	the	term	(in	its	adverbial	form:	‘infallibly’)	to	say	
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1).	 In	 the	 Second	 Replies	 he	 says	 that	 “someone	 with	 jaundice	 sees	

























tinct	perception	 is.	We	get	clues	 for	answering	 this	question	by	not-
ing	which	kinds	of	perceptions	can	be	clear	and	distinct,	and	to	what	
degree.
1.2 Clear and Distinct Sense-Perception, Imagination, and Intellection
Commentators	sometimes	assume	that,	in	Descartes’s	view,	only	intel-
lection	 can	 be	 clear	 and	 distinct;	 sense-perception	 and	 imagination	
cannot.8	 But	 Descartes	 says	 otherwise.9	 He	 explicitly	 invokes	 clear	
visual	 perception	 when	 he	 defines	 clarity,	 in	 Principles	 i.45:	 “we	 see	
something	clearly	when	—	being	present	to	the	eye’s	gaze	—	it	strikes	it	
with	a	sufficient	degree	of	force	and	openness”.	Elsewhere,	he	says,	for	















10.	 Compare	 the	 corresponding	 passage	 in	 the	 First	 Meditation,	 where,	 after	
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The True-to-Essence Reading (TE)
•	A	perception	of	x	is	clear	to	the	extent	that	it	ascribes	to	x 
features	which	are	consistent	with	the	essence	of	x.
•	 A	 perception	 of	 x	 is	 distinct	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	
clear	 and	 (in	 Descartes’s	 words)	 “contains	 only	 what	

















do not have the required kind of certainty with regard to mat-
ters which we perceive solely by means of the senses, however 
clear such perception may be.	…	Accordingly,	if	there	is	any	
certainty	to	be	had,	the	only	remaining	alternative	is	that	
it	occurs	in	the	clear perceptions of the intellect and nowhere 
else.	(2O/R, AT	7:145†)
As	Descartes	explains	in	the	Sixth	Meditation,	sense-perception	is	de-
signed	to	be	“clear	and	distinct	enough	[satis clarae & distinctae]”	 for	
practical	purposes	(AT	7:83)	—	just	not	enough	for	certainty.12
One	form	of	intellection	is	rational	insight	into	modal	truths	about	
what	 is	 necessary	 or	 merely	 possible,	 including	 truths	 about	 the	 es-
sences	or	natures	of	things.	Another	form	of	intellection	is	introspec-









contains	within	itself	only what is clear.	(Pr.	i.45,	AT	8A:22†)
12.	 See	Simmons	(2008;	2014).






Truths	about	 the	mind-in-general	are	exhausted	by	 truths	about	 the	
essence	of	 the	mind.	Such	 truths	are	not	contingent	 truths	but	 rath-
er	modal	truths,	as	they	identify	properties	that	are	either	necessary	
or	possible	for	a	mind:	a	mind	must be	thinking;	a	mind	can be judg-
ing,	doubting,	willing,	 imagining,	 sensing,	 feeling	various	emotions,	




















as	 I’ve	 argued	 elsewhere,	 Descartes	 rejects	 any	 such	 Transparency	
(Paul	 2018).	 In	 fact,	 he	 documents	 various	 ways	 in	 which	 introspec-
tion	is	fallible.	For	example,	introspection	can	misrepresent	a	purely	
In	Patterson’s	illustration	of	choice,	x is	the	mind.15	Given	Descartes’s	
mind-body	 dualism,	 properties	 that	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 es-





that	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 mind	 include	 the	 prin-
cipal	 attribute	 of	 bodies	—	i.e.	 extension	—	as	 well	 as	 specific	 modes	
of	extension,	i.e.	specific	sizes,	shapes,	locations,	and	motions.	So,	on	
Patterson’s	 reading,	 the	more	a	perception	of	 the	mind	ascribes	spe-





























senses	and	 imagination,	 for	which	 truth isn’t necessary.	Recall,	 for	ex-
ample,	Descartes’s	assertion	that	a	person	with	jaundice	may	visually	
perceive	that	snow is yellow “just	as	clearly	and	distinctly”	as	most	of	us	



















Let’s	 return	 to	 the	 case	 of	 strictly	 clear	 and	 distinct	 (intellectual)	
perception,	for	which	truth	is	necessary.	Even	so,	truth	isn’t	sufficient.	
A	perception	may	be	true	even	though	it	is	obscure	or	confused.	Des-





















cartes’s	 words)	 it	 “contains	 only	 what	 is	 clear”	—	so,	 on	 this	 reading,	






































perceive	 that	 God exists.	 And	 we	 get	 the	 same	 problem	 yet	 again	 if	





























clarity	 is	 required	 [sola ratione perspicuitatem requirimus].	
(AT	7:147–8)	
Descartes	 uses	 the	 phrase	 ‘formal	 reason’	 to	 contrast	 the	 content	 or	
“subject-matter”	of	a	perception	with	the	particular	form of	perception,	
namely	clear	perception,	that	provides	a	reason	for	assent.	You	make	
a	 judgement	when	you	assent	 to	 the	content	of	a	perception.	But	 if	
you	 have	 a	 reason for	 assenting,	 what	 gives	 you	 a	 reason	 is	 not	 the	
content	itself	but	rather	the	particular	way	in	which	you	perceive	the	
content	—	i.e.	clearly.	Indeed,	Descartes	adds,	“this	formal	reason	con-
sists	in	a	certain	inner	light	[haec ratio formalis consistit in lumine quodam 
interno]”	(Ibid.);	and	this	“‘light	in	the	intellect’	means	transparent	clar-
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conceive	of	a	chiliagon	(as	a	thousand-sided	figure),	and	this	differs	
































26.	Presentational	 phenomenology	 is	 of	 vital	 interest	 to	 some	 contemporary	












3. Explaining the Phenomenal View
The	 phenomenality,	 or	 phenomenal	 character,	 of	 a	 thought	 is	 the	
subjectively	felt	or	experienced	quality	of	“what	it’s	like”	to	have	that	
thought.22	 Remember	 that	 Descartes	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘thought’	 (cogi-










22.	 This	use	of	 the	phrase	 “what	 it’s	 like”	was	made	 famous	by	Nagel	 (1974).	 I	




(2007),	 Lähteenmäki	 (2007),	 Nadler	 (2011:	 134),	 Shapiro	 (2012),	 Simmons	
(2008;	2012;	2017).
23.	 This	 follows	 from	 two	 Cartesian	 commitments:	 (i)	 we	 are	 conscious	 of	 all	
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“vivid	 images”	 in	 the	 mind	 which	 are	 “forceful”	 or	 “compelling”.	 But	















These	 axioms	 are	 so	 simple	 that	 a	 typical	 mature	 human	 can	 intuit	
them	 directly,	 just	 by	 attentively	 considering	 them.	 Contrast	 this	
theorem:
D. If	π(x)	is	the	number	of	primes	less	than	or	equal	to	x, 
then	x−1π(x)	ln	x →	1	as	x → ∞.30
27.	 Gaukroger	contends	 that	 this	 is	a	shift	 from	Descartes’s	early	work,	 the	Re-
gulae,	to	his	later	work.	In	my	view,	Descartes	consistently	holds	throughout	
his	career	that	perceptions	of	all	kinds	can	be	clear	to	some	degree	but	only	


















































Some	 truths	 are	 readily	 made	 clear	 through	 diagrams	 or	 illus-




Each	proposition	—	E, F, G, H	—	was	true	from	the	beginning	when	
you	perceived	it	obscurely.	Each	would	be	true	if	you	were	to	assume,	
pretend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	that	it’s	true	—	which	are	all	ways	of	per-
ceiving	obscurely.	So	again,	 contrary	 to	 the	 intentional	 reading,	per-
ceiving	something	clearly	 is	not	simply	a	matter	of	perceiving	some-
thing	true.	Notice	what	it’s	like	as	each	proposition	becomes	clear	to	
you.	 It’s	 like	 the	 truth	gets	 illuminated.	 In	each	case,	 the	proposition	
33.	 His	example	is:	2+2	=	4;	1+3	=	4;	therefore,	2+2	=	3+1.
34.	 In	such	cases,	Descartes	insists	that	it	is	still	through	your	intellect	that	you	




























because	 you	 automatically	 performed	 a	 deduction	 like	 this	 yourself.	
31.	 Thanks	to	William	Egri	for	suggesting	examples	E	and	F.
















3.3 Clarity Is Adverbial
One	 obstacle	 to	 seeing	 the	 viability	 of	 the	 phenomenal	 reading	 is	








they	 thought	 had	 intentionality	 but	 no	 phenomenality.	 Sarah	 Patter-
son	seems	to	adopt	this	dichotomy	when	she	opposes	her	“intentional	













There	 are	 differences,	 however.	 One	 difference	 we	 should	 stress	






ly	seems	or	appear	 to	be	 true”	 (AT	 7:511†).	Thus,	Descartes	employs	
success-entailing	terms	to	say	that	what	you	perceive	in	such	cases	is	










conclusion	 are	 both	 contingent	 truths.	 Descartes	 often	 replaces	 the	
generic	premise	I am thinking	with	claims	about	the	specific	thought	
one	is	having	at	a	given	moment:	I am doubting; I think I am walking; I 





tion,	 introspection	 can be	 completely	 clear,	 but	 that	 doesn’t	 mean	 it	
always	is.	
For	 starters,	 like	 any	 form	 of	 perception,	 introspection	 admits	 of	
variations	in	clarity.	If	you	have	a	mild	pain,	it	may	not	be	clear	to	you	










































we	 perceive.	 For	 example,	 sensuous	 qualities	 like	 colour,	 heat,	 and	
taste	appear	 to	be	properties	of	 things	we	perceive:	 the	apple	 looks	
red,	the	stove	feels	hot,	the	mango	tastes	sweet.	Such	qualities	are	part	
of	what we	perceive.













Clarity	 is	 likewise	 an	 adverbial	 phenomenal	 quality.	 When	 your	
perception	is	clear,	its	clarity	is	not	an	object	of	that	very	perception,	
but	 characterizes	 the	 way	 you	 are	 perceiving.	 Suppose	 you’re	 look-
ing	at	a	 robin	 in	 the	woods.	When	 it’s	 far	away	and	you	perceive	 it	
obscurely,	you	perceive	it	as	having	a	certain	shape	and	colour. When	




that	 should	 not	 mislead	 us	 into	 reifying	 a	 referent	 for	 ‘clear’	 as	 if	 it	
were	some	thing	or	property	that	you’ve	now	come	to	see.	When	we	
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is	an	attempt	to	explain	or	convey	what	x is,	let	us	distinguish	between	
logical definitions and	ostensive definitions.	To	start	with	the	former:
A logical definition of	x is	an	attempt	to	convey	what	x is 
by	analyzing	x into	more	basic	conditions	that	are	each	
logically	 necessary	 and	 together	 logically	 sufficient	 to	
make	something	x.	





We	 cannot,	 however,	 give	 a	 logical	 definition	 of	 anything	 phe-
nomenal.	This	goes	not	just	for	phenomenality	in	general	but	also	for	



























4.1 Clarity Is Primitive
We’re	about	to	see	that	Descartes	regards	clarity	as	primitive,	in	a	cer-
tain	 sense.	 While	 the	 intentional	 reading	 does	 not	 account	 for	 this	
point,	the	phenomenal	reading	does.








(Lennon	 2008:	 171).	 On	 this	 reading,	 a	 perception	 of	 p	 is	 successful	—	and	
thus	clear	and	distinct	—	precisely	insofar	as	p is	true.	But	truth	is	not	adver-












is	to the	perceiving	subject:	“p is	clear	to S”.
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Things	which	“we	cannot	know	about	unless	we	see	them”	(as	he	says	
in	 the	Search)	—	or	 things	which	do	not	admit	of	 “logical	definitions”	
(as	he	says	here	in	the	Principles)	—	are	primitive	in	the	sense	I	identi-
fied	above.	
Descartes	 gives	 at	 least	 four	 indications	 that	 clarity	 is	 primitive.	
First,	 when	 we	 consider	 Descartes’s	 list	 of	 primitives	—	including	
thought, doubt, and	certainty —	it	seems	like	clarity belongs	in	the	same	






is	 not	 just	 in	 the	 same	 category	 as	 clarity:	 it	 is clarity.	 Descartes	 of-
ten	uses	terms	for	‘certain’	(certus) and	‘clear’	(clarus, perspicuus) inter-
changeably.	In	a	prominent	strand	of	Latin	usage	going	back	to	Cicero,	



























us	of	them	is	simply	our own experience or awareness	—	that	
awareness	 or	 internal	 testimony	 which	 everyone	 expe-
riences	 within	 himself	 when	 he	 ponders	 such	 matters.	
Thus	it	would	be	pointless	trying	to	define,	for	someone	
totally	blind,	what	it	is	to	be	white:	in order to know what 






[its]	own”,	by	being	acquainted	with	white	 itself	as	 it	occurs	 in	 “our	
own	experience”	when	we	“see	white”,	which	is	why	“someone	totally	
blind”	has	no	way	of	learning	“what	white	is”.	















(v)	 a cause of	 (sensory)	 clarity	—	i.e.	 forceful	 impact	 on	
sensory	organs.
(vi)	an effect	of	(complete)	clarity	—	i.e.	compelled	assent.







the	 Meditations and	 in	 other	 works	 as	 well.	 Indeed,	 that	 is	 precisely	
what	 he	 is	 doing	 in	 the	 notoriously	 puzzling	 text	 where	 he	 defines	
clarity	in	Principles i.45:
I	call	 something	 ‘clear’	when	 it	 is	present	and	open	<Fr.	
manifest>	to	the	attentive	mind	—	just	as	we	say	that	we	
see	 something	 clearly	 when,	 being	 present	 to	 the	 eye’s	
gaze,	it	strikes	it	with	enough	force	and	openness	[Claram 
voco illam, quae menti attendenti praesens & aperta <Fr. mani-
feste> est: sicut ea clarè à nobis videri dicimus, quae, oculo in-








debt	 to	 the	 meditational	 tradition,	 see	 Hatfield	 (1985;	 1986;	 2003),	 Mercer	
(2014;	2016),	Secada	(2013),	and	Vendler	(1989).
perception,	 and	 of	 obscure	 and	 confused	 perception,	
and	 thereby	 accustom	 themselves	 to	 distinguishing what 







There	 is	a	close	connection	between	rules	and	 logical	definitions.	 If	
there	 is	 a	 logical	 definition	 of	 x,	 then	 it	 can	 be	 used	 to	 formulate	 a	
rule	for	determining	whether	or	not	something	is	x. The	logical	defi-
nition	of	octagon,	for	example,	yields	an	obvious	rule	for	determining	
whether	 or	 not	 something	 is	 an	 octagon:	 Check	 whether	 or	 not	 it’s	
a	closed	plane	figure	with	eight	straight	sides.	If	there	were	a	logical	
definition	 of	 clarity,	 there	 would	 be	 a	 corresponding	 rule	 for	 deter-
mining	whether	something	is	clear	as	opposed	to	being	obscure.	But	
Descartes	says	the	difference	between	clarity	and	obscurity	is	not	to	







the	 cogito,	 various	 other	 axioms	 or	 first	 principles	 that	
can	be	intuited,	as	well	as	various	theorems	that	can	be	
deduced.
(ii)	 synonyms	 for	 ‘clear’	—	i.e.	 (phenomenally)	 ‘pres-
ent’,	‘open	[to	view]’,	‘manifest’,	‘evident’,	‘perspicuous’	or	
‘transparent’;	and,	for	sensory	clarity,	‘lively	and	vivid’.	
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define	clarity	logically	in	terms	of	another	property	(viz. truth,	or	truth	































or	perspicuus (e.g.	AT	7:62,	147–8),	or	vividae & expressae	(recall	§1.2).
This	isn’t	good	for	the	intentional	reading.	If	Descartes	defines	clarity	
in	terms	of	truth	(or	essences	or	natures),	why	doesn’t	he	say	so	when	









the	dative	construction:	menti attendenti, “to	the	attentive	mind.” Clarity	
isn’t	just	a	matter	of	the	object	itself	but	of	how	that	object	is	presented	










properties,	 this	 sentence	 defines	 clarity	 by	 pointing	 to	 it.	 It	 does	 so	
in	three	of	the	six	ways	mentioned	above:	by	identifying	an	enabling 
condition	for	any	clear	perception	(i.e.,	attention);	synonyms	for	‘clear’	






duction.	 I	 agree	 with	 LoLordo	 that	 the	 definition	 “would	 not	 help	 anyone	
understand	clarity	and	distinctness	from	the	outside”	(2005:	59	n.	15).




digm	of	 clarity	—	the	 intuition	of	 the	 cogito —	in	a	way	 that	explicitly	
highlights	 its	 phenomenality.	 In	 a	 letter	 to	 Descartes,	 Silhon	 con-
tends	 that,	 because	 we	 are	 embodied,	 we	 are	 so	 prone	 to	 obscurity	
and	 confusion	 that	 we	 cannot	 have	 intuitive	 knowledge	 during	 our	
earthly	lives	and	must	await	the	beatific	vision	of	God	in	the	afterlife.	
In	reply,	Descartes	grants	that	whatever	clarity	we	enjoy	in	this	life	is	
fleeting	and	surely	pales	 in	comparison	 to	 the	 “pure,	constant,	clear,	
certain,	effortless,	and	ever-present	 light”	of	 the	“beatific	vision”	(To	












primary,	 unearned	 and	 certain	 apprehension	 which	 we	
touch	 [touchons]	 with	 our	 mind	 with	 more	 confidence	
than	we	give	to	the	testimony	of	our	eyes.	You	will	surely	
admit	that	you	are	less	certain	of	the	presence	of	the	ob-




and	 handles	 [la voit, la sent & la manie];	 and	 although	
your	 imagination	 insistently	 mixes	 itself	 up	 with	 your	
thoughts	and	lessens	their	clarity	by	trying	to	clothe	them	
is	 even	 more	 obvious	 in	 the	 original	 Latin	 and	 French,	 where	 both	
clarus	and	clair	connote	bright,	vivid,	vibrant,	or	loud,	and	obscurus and	
obscur connote	dark,	dim,	 faint,	or	quiet.	The	authors	of	 the	Second	
Objections find	 it	natural	 to	speak	of	 truths	 that	are	 “as	clear	as	 the	
sunlight”	—	a	 phrase	 that	 Descartes	 repeats	 with	 approval	 in	 his	 re-
sponse	(AT	7:126,	146).	In	French,	when	a	truth	is	evident	or	manifest	
to	us,	we	can	say,	“C’est clair comme le jour” — “It’s	as	bright	as	day.”	
































me	 to	 remember	 how	 I	 arrived	 at	 that	 conclusion.	 (M3, 
AT	7:47†)	









a	 higher-order	 act.	 In	 order	 to	 perceive	 p	 clearly,	 what	 you	 have	 to	
concentrate	on	is	p	itself,	not	your	perception	of	p.	
The	fact	that	clarity	requires	attention	is	yet	another	mark	against	




is	 that	 innate	 ideas	 are	 clear	 and distinct”	 (2001:	 292).	 While	 Smith	
regards	this	implication	as	a	virtue	of	his	reading,	I	see	it	as	a	problem.	
In	Descartes’s	view,	we	always	have	innate	ideas	—	of	God,	extension,	
















expressly	highlighting	 the	 feeling	of	 intuition;	we	might	similarly	de-
scribe	it	as	the	feeling	of	“grasping”	or	“getting	hold	of”	a	truth.	He	is,	
in	 effect,	 rehearsing	 the	 strategy	 of	 the	 Meditations:	 using	 the	 cogito 








In	 the	 Second	 Replies,	 after	 recapping	 some	 important	 claims	 from	




[My perception	 of	 the	 wax	 can	 be] imperfect	 and	 con-
fused,	as	it	was	before,	or	clear	and	distinct,	as	it	is	now,	
depending	on	the	degree	to	which	I	attend [minus vel ma-
gis … attendo]	to	what	the	wax	consists	in.	(M2, AT	7:31*†)
[Upon	completing	the	first	argument	for	the	existence	of	
44.	 On	uses	of	 the	 light	metaphor	more	broadly	 in	the	17th	century,	see	Jolley	
(1990).












































4.5 The Truth Rule Is Not Trivial
The	 intentional	 reading	 defines	 clarity	 and	 distinctness	 in	 terms	 of	
truth	(or	at	least	truth	with	respect	to	the	essences	or	natures	of	things).	
On	this	reading,	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	true	by	definition.	












bers”	 (Smith	 2001:301,	 citing	 Nelson	 1996:	 24).	 Some	 things	 become	 clear	







48.	 Or	 to	 adapt	 Lennon’s	 own	 comparisons,	 it	 would	 be	 like	 asking	 whether	
someone	who	has	successfully	sought	a	thimble	has	found	it,	or	whether	a	
doctor	who	has	successfully	treated	a	patient	has	cured	him	(2008:	173).




contains	within	itself	only what is clear [Distinctam autem 
illam, quæ, cum clara sit, ab omnibus aliis ita sejuncta est et 




with	some	additional	 feature,	but	as	clarity	 in the absence of	—	“sharp-
ly	separated”	or	literally	“cut	off”	and	“separated”	(sejuncta et praecise)	
from	—	anything	unclear.	Notice	the	double-negation:	a	perception	is	
distinct	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it’s	 not	 contaminated	 by	 what	 is	 not clear.	
Distinctness	is	simply	the	purest	case	of	clarity,	obtaining	when	a	per-












It	 is	 clear	 that	 we	 do	 not	 have	 this	 kind	 of	 certainty	 in	
cases	where	our	perception	is	even the slightest bit obscure	
or	confused;	for	such	obscurity,	whatever its degree,	is	quite	
sufficient	 to	make	us	have	doubts	 in	 such	cases.	 (2O/R, 
AT	7:145†)






less	 obscurity,	 and	 vice	 versa.	 But	 there	 is	 an	 asymmetry	 between	













50.	Martha	 Bolton	 makes	 a	 similar	 suggestion	 when	 she	 says	 that	 obscurity	
and	confusion	are	“privations”	of	clarity	and	distinctness	(Bolton	1986:	389).	
While	scholastic	philosophers	distinguished	between	at	least	three	different	
















(c)	very	clear	perception: a pain exists.	 
(o)	obscure	perception:	something in my foot exists. 












or	 in	our	perception,	but	as being in the hand or foot or in 
some other part of our body.	(Pr. i.67†)
Our	 perception	 of	 the	 pain	 and	 our	 perception	 of	 something	 in	 the	
foot	are	not	separated	but	are	fused	into	an	indiscriminate	whole.	








precisely,	 it	 can	 be	 relatively	 clear,	 or	 even	 very clear	—	without	 be-




For	 example,	 when	 someone	 feels	 an	 intense	 pain,	 [c] 
the perception he has of this pain is	 indeed	 very	 clear,	 but	
is	not	always	distinct.	For	people	commonly	confuse this 








confused	—	literally	 “fused	 together”	 (confusio).	 One	 of	 them	 is	 (c)	 a	










but	a	 judgement	 is a	perception,	 in	his	view:	 it’s	 a	perception	 “with	














or	 the	 ‘only	 person’,	 or	 the	 ‘one	 and	 only	 person’	 in	 the	 room.	 This	
is	 because	 only-ness	 is	 not	 a	 property	 in	 its	 own	 right	 to	 be	 added	
to	one-ness:	it’s	just	the	condition	of	being	one	thing	in	the	absence	

























Interpreting	 distinctness	 as	 nothing	 other	 than	 complete	 clarity	
resolves	a	puzzle	in	Descartes’s	usage.	Recall	his	view	that	a	“percep-
tion	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	certain	and	indubitable	judge-












Admittedly	my	nature	 is	such	 that	so	 long	as	 I	perceive	
something	 very	 clearly and distinctly	 I	 cannot	 but	
52.	 In	other	work	(Paul	2018)	I	examine	these	passages	in	more	detail	to	argue	
















pletely	clear	perception	that	p.	And	so	on,	ad	 infinitum.	 If	 this	were	





further	 is	 required,	 including	 any	 act	 of	 higher-order	 apprehension	
or	 thought.	 When	 you	 perceive	 p	 with	 complete	 clarity,	 there	 is	 no	
room	 for	 doubt	 or	 deliberation,	 including	 higher-order	 deliberation.	
The	clarity	of	your	perception	compels	your	assent,	and	the	resulting	
judgement	just	is an	act	of	apprehension.	I	develop	this	point	in	other	
work,56	but	what	 I	want	 to	observe	here,	 in	closing,	 is	how	it	under-
scores	the	primacy	of	clarity	itself.	Since	clarity	is	primitive,	there	are	
no	independent	criteria	we	can	use	to	identify	clarity.	Nor	do	we	need	












  •  Obscurity	is	the	absence	of	clarity.
  • Confusion	 is	 the	 condition	 whereby	 one	  
	 	 perception	 is	 fused	 with	 another	 in	 way	 that	  
  lessens its clarity.
  •  Distinctness	is	the	condition	whereby	a	clear		
	 	 perception	is	‘sharply	separated’	from	anything	 
	 	 obscure	so	that	it’s	completely clear.
We	 began	 by	 noting	 that	 clear	 and	 distinct	 perception	 is	 the	 center-




In	 other	 work,	 I	 elaborate	 on	 Descartes’s	 Clarity	 First	 thesis	 by	
showing	that,	in	his	view,	clarity	is	prior	in	a	different	way	—	not	defi-
nitionally	but	explanatorily	—	to	six	other	key	properties.	When	your	
perception	 is	 completely	 clear,	 its	 clarity	 explains	 why	 you	 have	 (i)	
a	conclusive	reason	for	assent	(belief,	 judgement), (ii)	 rational	 indu-
bitability,	(iii)	psychological	indubitability,	(iv)	spontaneity	(the	high-
est	grade	of	human	freedom),	(v)	infallibility,	and	(vi)	apprehension. 






claims	 to	 have	 complete	 clarity	 on	 various	 matters,	 he	 also	 admits	
that	there	have	been	things	which	“through	habitual	belief	I thought 
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